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This paper examines the consequences of university patenting by using 
an original source of information: The point of view of French 
academic inventors, i.e. French university professors who are also 
inventors of European patents. Via a survey we collected information 
about 280 French academic inventors. This enables us to put forward 
new insights with respect to the effect of university patenting on the 
diffusion of scientific research, incentives to do basic research, 
commercialization of university inventions and access to upstream 
knowledge. In particular, the study suggests a tradeoff between 
enabling the transfer of university inventions to industry in some 
sectors and delaying the dissemination of scientific research. On the 
one hand, most academic inventors acknowledge a lag in their 
publication process directly attributable to the patent application but, 
on the other hand, in life science disciplines a large majority of 
respondents who have had one of their inventions commercialized, 
believe that this would not have been the case had a patent not been 
there. 
 
Keywords: University patenting, open science, intellectual property rights, technology 
transfer, university-industry relationships, Bayh-Dole Act. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
This paper deals with the role of patents in academia. Specifically, it focuses on the 
consequences of university patenting on the dissemination of scientific knowledge, transfer of 
universities inventions to industry, access to upstream research, incentives scientists have in 
order to undertake basic research and the culture of “open science”. Although these issues 
have been widely dealt with in the literature (Henderson et al. 1998; Mowery et al. 2001; 
Stephan et al. 2001; Mazzoleni and Sampat 2002; Nelson 2004; Buenstorf 2006; Eisenberg 
2006; Geuna and Nesta 2006; Sampat 2006; Verspagen 2006; Fabrizio 2007; Murray and 
Stern 2007), we bring new insights by using an original source of information: The point of 
view of French professors who have been involved as inventors in a European patent 
application (academic inventors in the following). Via a survey conducted in April and May 
2008, we collected information about 280 French academic inventors. 
 
The traditional model of public research (the open science model) views universities as being 
devoted to provide a reservoir of public knowledge in which firms can tap to develop 
industrial applications. In this sense, patents had historically almost no place in the “republic 
of science” (Polanyi 1962), which relied on rapid and free publications of research results 
(Bush 1945; Nelson 1959; Dasgupta and David 1994; Stephan 1996). Yet, during the past 
three decades one has observed a strong and steady trend towards university patenting. If the 
Bayh-Dole Act
2 (1980) in the US symbolizes this rupture, nowadays this trend can be 
observed worldwide. Universities and public research organizations all over the world 
massively patent the outcome of their research (Mowery et al., 2001; Mazzoleni and Sampat 
2002; Cesaroni and Piccaluga 2002; Geuna and Nesta 2006; Azagra-Caro et al. 2006; Carayol 
and Matt 2007; Lissoni et al. 2007)
3. 
 
Scholars have extensively discussed the effects of this trend on social welfare. On the one 
hand, it is argued that patenting academic invention is necessary to facilitate technology 
transfer and to decrease the rate of public inventions that remain on the shelves of universities 
(The Bay-Dole Act hypothesis). This argument relies on the assumption that universities 
inventions must be appropriable to induce firms to commercialise them. In the absence of 
property rights, universities inventions would not provide firms with any competitive 
advantage over their rivals, which would deter them from adopting products and processes 
developed within universities (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Verspagen 2006). Moreover, it is 
                                                 
2 An important literature has emerged recently around the issue of the Bayh-Dole Act and its consequences on 
US academic research (Mowery et al. 2001; Mowery and Ziedonis 2002; Mowery et al. 2004; Sampat 2006). It 
is generally agreed that although the Bayh-Dole Act has accompanied the trend, it was not the factor which 
triggered university patenting, since many important US universities started to patent their research in the 70s 
(see for instance Colyvas 2007, for a detailed story of the Cohen-Boyer patent). 
3According to USPTO statistics, US universities owned 1.1% of US owned patents issued between 1969 and 
1984. Since 1984 this share has increased continuously and was equal to 4.8% in 1999 (Mazzoleni and Sampat 
2002). This increase in university patenting has mechanically induced an augmentation of licensing of university 
patents. An inquiry of the AUTM (Association of University Technology Managers) shows that in 1991 US 
universities had granted 1043 licenses to firms, while the same universities had granted more than the double 
(2351) in 1998. Yet, Mowery et al. (2001) notice that most licenses granted by US universities contained 
somehow exclusive arrangements. In parallel to this increase of patenting, US universities have also adopted a 
more aggressive use of their patent portfolios. Some of them do not hesitate to enforce their patents in court. 
Although not as aggressive as in the US yet, a similar trend can be observed in Europe. In France, most public 
research organizations are now engaged in an active patenting policy. In 2004 the CNRS was ranked number six 
with respect to French patents held by French organizations. INSERM and INRA were also ranked high (INPI, 
2005). Similarly, French universities are now patenting more systematically their research (Azagra-Caro et al. 
2006; Carayol and Matt 2007; Lissoni et al. 2007).  
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 also often argued that patenting universities research is a way to close the gap between 
universities and corporate research (Crespi, 1998). Patents would provide a common language 
and a common practice, which would help to develop links between universities and industry. 
University patents could therefore help to anchor universities within industrial networks. 
Finally, allowing universities to own patents may also enable them to increase their financial 
resources through licensing and industrial research contracts (Geuna and Nesta 2006). 
 
But on the other hand, university patenting can also have numerous “unintended effects” 
(Davis et al. 2008). For instance, it is feared that it might increase the cost of accessing 
upstream research, decrease the incentives to do basic, non-patentable research, decrease the 
trust among public researchers and thus undermine the culture of open science, decrease the 
teaching quality of university professors, decrease the publication rate of researchers, etc. 
(Mowery et al., 2004; Geuna and Nesta 2006). Overall, it is feared that academic patents 
undermine the construction and availability of a platform of scientific, upstream knowledge 
on which applications may flourish (David 2003; Nelson 2004). In this sense, university 
patenting would seriously damage the pace of innovation in the long run. 
 
Many empirical studies have documented some of the aspects of university patenting. There 
are converging results, for instance, on the fact that university patenting does not decrease the 
performance of researchers, measured in numbers of publications (Stephan et al. 2001; Van 
Looy et al. 2006; Carayol and Matt 2007). Yet, survey based studies almost all indicate that 
academic patenting and licensing do affect the norm of disclosure, lead to higher levels of 
secrecy and participate to delay publication (Blumenthal et al., 1997 ; Louis et al., 2001 ; 
Campbell et al., 2002). It has also been demonstrated that in some specific sectors 
(pharmaceuticals, biotechnology) university patenting does facilitate technology transfer from 
university to industry (Mansfield, 1986; Levin et al., 1987, Cohen et al., 2002). However, we 
lack general evidence on the social desirability of university patenting. 
 
This paper complements the existing literature by proposing a new source of data to study the 
consequences of university patenting. We asked directly to academic inventors. Those are 
indeed likely to be the best persons to know about the consequences of their patenting 
activities. To gather the information, we sent a questionnaire (via email) to French academic 
professors (not full time researchers), who had formerly been identified as inventors in a 
European patent application. Previous studies had identified 1228 confirmed French academic 
inventors (Lissoni et al. 2007). Out of this number we had been able to collect 280 responses, 
i.e. a response rate of over 20%. This sample is reasonably representative of the mother 
population of confirmed French academic inventors. 
 
Relevance of questionnaire based studies is always limited by the fact that we do not work on 
objective figures but on what respondents tell us. And respondents may not always tell the 
truth, which can lead to multiple biases. In our study, most respondents seem to be patent 
enthusiastic, thus exaggerating sometimes the merit of university patenting and diminishing 
the problems (most of the time unconsciously). Yet, in the case of university patenting, where 
objective figures are rare, our study has the merit of providing new and rich qualitative 
insights. 
 
The first statistical analysis of the responses put forward two important results: First, 
university patenting induces a systematic delay in the publication process. In most cases 
academic researchers acknowledge a lag in the date of publication of their research directly 
attributable to the patent application. This lag is sometimes short (less than 6 months) but in 
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 half the cases it amounts to more than one year and it can even exceed 2 years. In some 
extreme cases publication is not allowed at all. Some researchers also often acknowledge a 
control of the partner firm over the content of their publications. The second important result 
deals with the Bayh-Dole hypothesis, which is confirmed only in some scientific disciplines. 
This hypothesis seems to be especially relevant in life science sectors such as biology, 
pharmaceuticals and medical sciences, but less so in engineering. In life science sectors, most 
of the researchers that are inventors of an invention that has been commercialized consider 
that the patent has played a central role in this commercialization. This is specifically true for 
pharmaceuticals, for instance, where 100% of the respondents considered that their invention 
would not have been transferred in the industry had a patent not been there. With respect to 
the consequences of university patenting, our study suggests therefore a trade-off between 
easing the commercialisation of university inventions in some sectors and delaying the 
dissemination of public knowledge. 
 
Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the consequences of university patenting. Section 
3 provides a description of our sample and compares it with the mother population of 
confirmed French academic inventors. It specifically discusses the possibility of a bias due to 
the methodology used (declared and not revealed preferences). In section 4 we display the 
results of the survey. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Consequences of university patenting have been extensively discussed in the literature. We 
provide here an overview of possible effects that have been identified. Yet, this survey does 
not pretend to provide an exhaustive picture of all the consequences of university patenting 
and licensing. 
 
Dissemination of academic knowledge 
Academic patenting may retard the dissemination of scientific research. In France, as in other 
European countries, inventions must be kept secret before applying for a patent. Any 
disclosure of the invention will add to prior art and therefore automatically prevent the 
granting of a patent. Inventors who want to patent must therefore implement a strict policy of 
secrecy before the application. With respect to the academia, this suggests that allowing and 
encouraging university to patent may retard the disclosure of university inventions. Public 
research organizations that want to apply for patents must delay the publication of their 
research related to the invention before a priority patent is filed. Since, the preparation of a 
patent application can take a long time, the lag in the dissemination of academic research can 
sometimes be important. In the US this effect is attenuated by the existence of a one year 
“grace period” that gives right to inventors to apply for a patent until one year after the first 
disclosure of the invention (Franzoni and Scellato 2007). 
 
Empirical studies do not provide convergent result with respect to the impact of university 
patenting on the diffusion of academic knowledge. Most econometric studies show that 
patents and publication are complement rather than substitutes, i.e. scientists who patent the 
most are also those who publish the most (Stephan et al. 2001; Buenstorf 2006; Van Looy et 
al. 2006; Carayol and Matt 2007). Van Looy et al. (2006) even find that academic patenting 
may reinforce the publication activity of scientists. This result can be interpreted, with all the 
necessary reservations, as evidence that academic patenting does not reduce the dissemination 
of academic research, as long as one accepts to measure the latter by the number of scientific 
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 publications. But, on the other hand, the limited qualitative evidence that exist suggests that 
patents do delay the publication process. Using a questionnaire based survey, Webster and 
Packer (1997) conclude that university patenting can compromise the dissemination of 
academic research. Similarly, a report of the European Commission (2002) directly addresses 
the question of the publication delay attributable to university patenting. Results show that a 
majority of respondents acknowledged to some extent a publication delay (see Geuna and 
Nesta 2006, for an interpretation and a critic of the finding of the EC report). Surveys led in 
the US also suggest a significant impact of academic patenting and licensing on the speed of 
dissemination of research results (Blumenthal et al., 1997; Louis et al., 2001; Campbell et al., 
2002). Finally, Breschi et al. (2005) use a methodology to match patent/publication pairs of 
Italian researchers and conclude that they “cannot exclude the existence of some ‘publication 
delay effect’” (Breschi et al. 2005, p. 18-19). 
 
Commercialization of academic inventions 
Academic patenting may facilitate the transfer of university inventions to industry. This is the 
so-called Bayh-Dole hypothesis, named after the Bayh-Dole Act (1980) in the US. According 
to Senators Bayh and Dole, the two initiators of this law, allowing universities to patent their 
inventions should increase technology transfer and industrial exploitation of academic 
research. Without patents, many inventions developed in academia would remain on the 
shelves of the university because “what is available to everybody is of interest to no one” 
(Mazzoleni and Sampat 2002, p. 237)
4. Firms have no incentives to commercialize inventions 
from universities, to undertake important investments to bring them to the market if, once this 
is done, they cannot appropriate the invention. Patents give an element of exclusivity over the 
invention and should therefore facilitate its commercialization (Verspagen 2006). 
 
With respect to this Bahy-Dole argument, important sectoral differences can be expected. 
Sampat (2006, p. 773), among others, asserts that: “Patents and licenses are considerably 
more important channels in pharmaceuticals that in other industries”. In field such as biotech 
and pharmaceuticals it is indeed well known that patents are essential to spur the development 
of new products (Mansfield 1986; Levin et al. 1987; Cohen et al. 2000). Yet, this may not be 
the case in other sectors. Mowery et al. (2004) stress the fact that in most sectors there exist 
other channels to transfer inventions from university to industry and thus the absence of 
patents does not always preclude the transfer of the invention to the industry. In those sectors 
“where exclusive licenses are not necessary to ensure commercialization of academic 
research, exclusivity may reduce the social benefit of the invention” (Mowery et al., 2004, p. 
191). 
 
Related to this issue of corporate use of academic inventions, it is often argued that letting 
university patent their research may help to improve relationships between universities and 
industry (Crespi 1998). Hellman (2007) suggests, for instance, that university patenting help 
to signal university research to industry, thus reducing the search costs and fostering 
collaborations, research contracts, technology transfer, etc. University patents would hence be 
a way to help university researchers going out of their “ivory tower” and getting closer to the 
“kingdom of industry”. They would ensure that academic scientists share norms similar to 
those of corporate scientists, which could only improve the links between the two worlds. In a 
sense, patenting would enable to anchor scientific research within industrial networks. 
 
                                                 
4 This argument derives from a statement of a pioneer academic inventor, the chemist F.G. Cottrell who said in 
1912: “what is everybody’s business is nobody’s business” (Cottrell 1912, cited in Mowery et al. 2004, p. 59). 
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 Despite the clarity of the theoretical argument, we lack empirical test of this Bayh-Dole 
hypothesis. An exception is the work of Jensen and Thursby (2001), who study licensing 
practices of 62 US universities. They argue that, since most university inventions are at a too 
embryonic stage to be readily commercialized, firms need the collaboration of the inventor. 
And university patenting and licensing is an efficient mechanism to force scientists’ 
collaborations. It provides a solution to the moral hazard problem faced by firms. They 
conclude that: “Many inventions are so embryonic that they might remain in the lab without 
licensing agreements designed to induce collaboration between inventors and licensees” 
(Jensen and Thursby 2001, p. 241). On the other hands, many authors question the relevance 
of this argument and rather claim that Bayh-Dole has decreased the quality of university 
patents (Henderson et al. 1998). 
 
Culture of “open science” 
University patenting may undermine interactions and free exchanges among scientists. The 
rise of patents within academia may diminish the collaborations between scientists, thus 
decreasing the efficiency of scientific communities. Here, university patenting would threaten 
the culture of open science at its heart. Since around a patent there may be important amounts 
of money at stake, or at least since scientists may believe that there are important amounts of 
money, university patenting may decrease the willingness of scientists to share their results 
and research materials. In this sense, scientists may become more “selfish” and less willing to 
collaborate and to help colleagues. Yet, as asserted by Verspagen (2006, p. 616), open science 
“works in an atmosphere of openness and sharing of knowledge, data and research results. It 
is exactly this open nature of the scientific process that is responsible for much of its success 
[…] Patents may turn this open culture into a more closed one”. As stressed above, empirical 
studies have emphasized that academic patenting and licensing may lead to increased secrecy 
and decrease the sharing of early research results (Blumenthal et al., 1997; Louis et al., 2001; 
Campbell et al., 2002). 
 
Furthermore, within the academic community patents are surrounded by ideological 
considerations, which lead an important part of the community to reject them. It is frequent to 
hear academic inventors complaining about the low consideration that their colleagues give to 
their patent attempt. In this sense, scientists who apply for patents may be ostracized within 
scientific communities, thus also decreasing the rate of exchanges and interactions among 
communities. 
 
Incentives to do basic research 
University patenting may decrease incentives to do basic research
5. Patents reward applied 
research. Theoretically basic research cannot be patented since, by definition, they consist of 
research undertaken without any application in mind, while an invention must have an 
industrial application in order to be patentable. It is therefore possible that the possibility to 
patent university research induces an eviction effect of basic research in favor of more applied 
research. Since the latter becomes more rewarded, scientists may prefer to engage more 
resources to do applied, patentable research and less to undertake basic, non patentable 
research
6. This eviction effect could seriously damage long term growth rate, since a platform 
                                                 
5 Similarly, university patenting may reduce the incentives to spend time on education. Since teaching becomes 
relatively less rewarded than doing patentable research, university professors may tend to reduce the time they 
devote to teaching (Geuna and Nesta 2006). 
6 Yet, this may not necessarily be the case if in the same time scientists devote less time to leisure. In this sense, 
the introduction of university patent can induce scientists to do more basic and applied research and to take less 
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 of good basic research is a necessary springboard to foster long run economic growth (Nelson 
1959; 2004). 
 
This problem is part of a wider issue in economics of science which is the “problem of 
problem choice” (Carayol and Dalle 2007), i.e. the choice by scientists of their research 
agenda. One of the pillars of the “the republic of science” is that scientists must be free to 
choose the problem they want. To ensure the efficiency of the process, no central regulator 
should oblige scientists to work on some specific topic (Polanyi 1962). Another pillar of the 
“republic of science” is that scientists decide their research agenda according to the effect on 
their reputation. This induces scientists to choose not the more remunerating problems to 
solve but the ones that will increase their reputation, i.e. the more challenging from an 
intellectual point of view. This, in turn, intends to encourage scientists to devote time and 
resources to undertake basic research, which is highly valued by the scientific community, 
and less time and resource to undertake applied research, less valued by the community. 
Hence, the “republic of science”, although likely to do it imperfectly, ensures that scientists 
have incentives to do basic research although this kind of research yields weak monetary 
benefits. By introducing patents within the “republic of science”, one may reduce those 
incentives and increase incentives to do applied research. 
 
If we measure the outcome of basic research by the number of publications (which is a poor 
proxy but also the only serious one that exists) the existence of such an eviction effect is 
rejected by empirical studies. As already mentioned above, researchers and labs who patent 
the most are also those who publish the most, which tends to indicate that researchers who are 
engaged in patentable activities do not do less basic research. However, a bundle of empirical 
studies also tend to suggest that academic patenting and licensing may shift the focus of 
academic research away from fundamental to more applied topics. Henderson et al. (1998), 
for instance, find that the quality of academic patent, measured by the number of forward 
citations, tend to decline since the early 80s’. A possible interpretation of this finding is a shift 
of US universities toward more applied research (with a less rich scientific content). Yet, 
Mowery et al. (2004) do not find evidence of such a quality decline. Similarly, Thursby and 
Thursby (2002) cannot reject the possibility of a crowding-out effect of basic research. 
Azoulay et al. (2006) also find out that university patenting may induce scientists to shift their 
research focus on things of more commercial interest. Finally, Gulbrandsen and Smeby 
(2005) found that in Norway professors who have links with industry tend to describe their 
research as more applied (see also Geuna and Nesta 2006). 
 
Access to upstream research 
University patenting may render access to scientific knowledge more costly. Condition of 
access to upstream knowledge is a central issue. Since innovation is somehow a cumulative 
process, knowledge is an input in the process of producing knowledge, which means that it is 
highly important to preserve as large as possible an access to existing knowledge in order to 
foster the production of further inventions. This is the basic argument that underlies the 
existence of the “republic of science”, which is based on a quick and free release of scientific 
knowledge through publications. 
 
Yet, patenting university research gives automatically an element of control to these 
researches, which may decrease their availability to other researchers. It is feared here that 
patents might increase the price of access to university inventions, thus decreasing their 
                                                                                                                                                          
leisure time (Thursby et al. 2007). Furthermore, Thursby et al., also suggest that if applied research results in 
both more applied and basic knowledge, the introduction of university patent has still a more positive effect.  
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 availability to build on and impeding the cumulative process of knowledge production. In 
fields where many patents are granted, such as biotechnology and electronics, some authors 
warn against the risks induced by a “patent thickets” (Shapiro 2001), by the emergence of a 
potential “tragedy of the anticommons” (Heller and Eisenberg 1998) or by a “privatization of 
the commons” (Nelson 2004). All these expressions suggest that the proliferation of patents in 
some specific fields may increase the cost of accessing knowledge and of doing science, 
which in turn would reduce research in these fields. 
 
With respect to the access to scientific knowledge by academic scientists, another potential 
damage caused by university patenting was raised by Eisenberg (2003), who analyzed the 
recent rejection by the CAFC in the US of an “experimental use defense” or a “research 
exception” to Duke University
7. Historically, academic researchers have always been 
considered as being unconcerned by patent infringements. As long as their research was 
undertaken for non-profit motives, for purpose of “idle curiosity” or “philosophical inquiry”, 
they could use patent held by others without having to ask for permission and without having 
to pay royalties. Yet, this situation may change as shown by the recent Madey vs. Duke 
decision, which “did not extinguish the experimental use defense entirely, but eviscerated it to 
the point that it is essentially useless to research universities” (Eisenberg 2003, p. 1019). This 
decision is in a sense a direct consequence of university patenting. Now that universities are 
using their patent portfolios more and more aggressively, one may indeed expect to see firms 
trying to secure their patents and starting to sue universities for patent infringements. By 
patenting massively and by using their patent portfolios aggressively, universities become a 
normal player in the patent game and there is no reason to grant them a “research exception”. 
This unintended consequence of university patenting may seriously damage scientific 
research, which works essentially by reusing research done elsewhere. 
 
By comparing the citation rate of scientific papers before and after a patent is granted, Murray 
and Stern do find a “robust evidence for a quantitatively modest but statistically significant 
anti-commons effect” (2007, p. 651) due to academic patenting. Yet, many recent studies in 
the field of biomedical sciences do not find that patents may impede access to upstream 
research. They rather put forward other impediments such as control over materials necessary 
to do research or secrecy. Following Cohen and Walsh (2008) one must indeed make a 
distinction between legal excludability (which is operated through patents) and practical 
excludability, which may have little to do with patents (Cohen and Walsh 2008). Specifically, 
Walsh et al. (2007, p. 1184) found that “access to knowledge inputs is largely unaffected by 
patents”. Out of the 381 academic scientists they interviewed “none reported having to stop 
their research due to the existence of third party patents” (Walsh, Cohen and Cho 2007, p. 
1190). Hence, “although patents may confer a legal right to exclude, it does not confer 






                                                 
7 Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (3 October 2002). 
8 In the case of biomedical science, the authors argue that access to upstream research is mainly restricted due to 
the use of secrecy or to the control firms have over their materials and not due to aggressive patenting strategies. 
For instance, researchers may merely refuse to share intermediary results and materials to reproduce 
experiments. Those central inputs to do science, such as private data, proteins, drugs, research tools, although not 
patented, are therefore made unavailable to other scientists. This is especially true when these intermediary 
materials are difficult to replicate. Cohen and Walsh find that most researchers in the biomedical field have 
already made requests to other colleagues that have been denied. 
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 3. Description of the dataset and representativeness 
 
Via a survey conducted in April and May 2008, we collected information about 280 French 
academic inventors
9. This sample stems from a wider population of French academic 
inventors identified in a previous study (Lissoni et al. 2007). By French academic inventors 
we mean French university scientists (i.e. Maître de Conférences [equivalent to associate 
professors] and University professors) active in a French university in 2004 and mentioned as 
inventor in at least one European patent applied for after 1993. Within a European project 
entitled KEINS
10, we were able to identify 1228 confirmed French academic inventors, by 
matching the European Patent Office (EPO) database of inventors since 1993 with the 
database of French university professors active in 2004. Those are confirmed academic 
inventors since they were all joined by telephone or email and they all confirmed being both 
university professors and mentioned as inventor in a European patent. This population of 
academic inventors amounts to 3.84% of the total population of French university scientists 
(Maîtres de Conférences plus University Professors) in the corresponding scientific 
disciplines (Lissoni et al. 2007). 
 
Out of these 1228 confirmed French academic inventors, we were able to send a questionnaire 
via email to 1122. For the remaining 106 scientists we were not able to find their email 
addresses. Moreover 104 email addresses proved to be invalid and 6 respondents answered 
that they were not concerned by our study, since they were inventors in a European patent 
before entering academia. Finally, the effective targeted population amounts to 1012 French 
academic inventors. Out of these 1012 inventors we collected 280 answers, which amount to a 
response rate of 27.7%. 
 
Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 give the profiles of the respondents according to their age, gender, 
academic ranking and scientific disciplines. It also provides similar information for the 
mother population, which enables us to analyze the representativeness of our sample. The 
statistics computed for the mother population are based on the 1228 confirmed French 
academic inventors identified by Lissoni et al. (2007). 
 
Table 3.1: From the population of French academic inventors to our sample 
French academic inventors identified by Lissoni et al. (2007)    1228 
No email addresses  - 106 
Invalid email addresses  - 104 
Not concerned  - 6 
French academic inventors who received a questionnaire    1012 
Responses collected    280 
Response rate: 
-  27.7% of the scientists to which the questionnaire was sent 
-  22.8% of the mother population of all the confirmed French academic inventors 
                                                 
9 The questionnaire is available on request to the author. It contains 16 questions and was voluntarily kept short 
in order to increase the response rate. Questions included the following points: In how many priority patents is 
the professor mentioned as inventor? Who generally is the owner of the patent? What is the policy of the lab in 
terms of patent? What was the motivation to patent? What direct consequences, either positive or negative, have 
been experienced? What is the point of view of the researcher about academic patenting?, etc. Furthermore, we 
are able to cross this information with the scientific discipline of the researcher, his university, his gender and his 
age. 
10 KEINS is the acronym of “Knowledge based Entrepreneurship: Innovation Networks and Systems”. 
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Table 3.2: Distribution by gender and academic ranking 
Respondents Mother  population 
 Number  %  Number  % 
Gender 
Male 250  89.3% 1110  90.4% 
Female 30  10.7% 118  9.6% 
Academic 
Ranking 
MCF 119  42.8% 443  36.1% 
PU 159  57.2% 785  63.9% 
Note: Based on a total of 280 respondents for the gender and 278 respondents for academic ranking. 
MCF=Maître de Conférences; PU=University Professor. 
 

















   Respondents        Mother population 
Age Number  %  Age  Number  % 
 More than 65  17  6.1%  More than 65  150  12.2% 
60-64 49  17.6%  60-64  258  21% 
55-59 43  15.5%  55-59  183  14.9% 
50-54 36  12.9%  50-54  148  12.1% 
45-49 52  18.7%  45-49  183  14.9% 
40-44 48  17.3%  40-44  205  16.7% 
35-39 29  10.4%  35-39  90  7.3% 
30-34 4  1.4%  30-34  11  0.9% 
Total 278  100%  Total  1228  100% 
Note: Based on 278 respondents. 
 
 
With respect to the representativeness of our sample, we can outline the following points: 
-  A huge majority of respondents are males (89.3%), which is in line with the mother 
population (about 90% of French confirmed academic inventors are males). 
-  There is an over-representation of Maîtres de Conférences in our sample (and 
therefore an under representation of University professors). This is likely to be 
correlated with the age variable since most of the time Maîtres de Conférences are 
younger than University Professors. 
-  There is an under-representation of aged academic inventors (over 60) (23.7% in the 
sample of respondents vs. 33.2% in the mother population). This feature of the sample 
may induce a bias since it is likely that old and young scientists do not have the same 
experiences about university patenting. 
-  There is an under-representation of medical sciences in the sample (10.4% in our 
sample vs. 19.1% in the mother population) and an over-representation of chemical 
scientists (28.1% vs. 23.1%). The under-representation of medical scientists can 
probably be explained by the difficulty to reach them. They are usually scientists 
working full time in hospitals and most of the time we did not have their direct email 





 The issue of multiple patents and the interpretation of the responses 
Most academic inventors in our sample are inventors of more than one patent. 80% of our 
respondents answer that they are inventors in more than one priority patent. Yet, for 
simplicity’s sake and in order to facilitate the treatment of the answers, in many questions we 
asked respondents to give only one answer. However, it is likely that for those inventors who 
have been involved in many patent applications, there is not one single appropriate answer 
because each patent application has its own context and story. Many respondents expressed 
therefore their frustration of not being allowed to give several answers and considered this as 
a serious limitation of the questionnaire. For those questions the figure presented here must 
therefore be considered as being the “average” answer; the one that best takes into 
consideration all the contexts of the different patent applications. 
 
Table 3.4: Distribution by scientific discipline 
  Respondents Mother  population 
DISCIPLINES 
Number of 
respondents   %  
Number of academic 
inventors   %  
Biological sciences (CNU sections 64 to 69)  44  15.8%  165  13.4% 
including     Biochemistry and molecular biology  17  6.1%  66  5.4% 
                    Cellular biology  12  4.3%  45  3.7% 
Chemical sciences (CNU sections 31, 32, 33)  78  28.1%  284  23.1% 
including    Theoretical, physical, analytical chemistry  12  4.3%  50  4.1% 
                    Organic, mineral, industrial chemistry  41  14.7%  140  11.4% 
                    Chemistry of materials  25  9%  94  7.7% 
Electronics (CNU section63) 45  16.2%  169  13.8% 
Medical sciences (CNU sections 43 to 59)  29  10.4%  235  19.1% 
Pharmaceuticals and drugs (CNU sections 39, 40, 41) 27  9.7%  109  8.9% 
including   Sciences physiquo-chemical and  
                      pharmaceutical technologies 12  4.3%  44  3.6% 
                   Drug sciences  11  4%  51  4.2% 
Engineering (CNU sections 60, 61, 62)  37  13.3%  153  12.5% 
including    IT engineering and signal treatment  15  5.4%  49  4% 
                   Energy, process engineering  16  5.8%  69  5.6% 
Others 18  6.5%  113  9.2% 
including    Materials  10  3.6%  45  3.7% 
Total 278  100%  1228  100% 
Note: Based on 278 respondents. 
 
 
The issue of hypothetical bias 
This study relies on what academic inventors tell us. Yet, scientists’ declarations may be 
biased due to their subjective opinion on university patenting, thus exaggerating or decreasing 
the merit of university patenting. This “hypothetical bias” is unfortunately a recurrent 
shortcoming of questionnaire based methodologies and is not specific to our study. 
 
To identify this possible bias, the last question of the questionnaire aimed at collecting the 
perception of academic inventors about the desirability of patents in science. The question 
was deliberately subjective in the sense that we did not ask respondents to answer according 
to their experiences or to objective facts but merely to give their opinion. We provided several 
statements such as “patenting public research facilitates their commercialisation” or 
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 “patenting public research increases the cost to access scientific knowledge”, and we asked 
respondents to give a mark to the statement, on a Likert scale, according to their degree of 
agreement: 0 if they totally disagree and 5 if they totally agree. Then, we aggregated the 
answers in three categories: We considered that the respondent agrees with the statement if he 
gave a mark equal to 4 or 5, that he disagrees for a mark equal to 0 or 1 and that he is neutral 
for a mark equal to 2 or 3. Results are displayed in Table 3.5
11. 
 
Overall, respondents are mostly favourable to university patenting. In their vast majority they 
believe that it has more positive consequences for social welfare than negative ones. Most 
respondents agree with the positive statements (statements 1 to 6 in Table 3.5), except for the 
fact that university patenting enable to finance public research. Conversely, respondents 
usually disagree in their majority with the negative statements (statements 7 to 10 in Table 
3.5). The sole negative point for which there is not a majority of respondents who disagree is 
the fact that university patenting may decrease the dissemination of scientific research. 
 
Table 3.5: Perception of university patenting by respondents  
According to you, university patenting: Disagree  Neutral  Agree 
1  Facilitate the commercialization of academic inventions  24.8% 22.4%  52.8% 
2  Increase the incentives of scientists to do research  64.7% 21.9%  13.4% 
3 
Increase the bargaining power of universities in front of   
Industrialists 18.7%  26.6%  54.7% 
4  Facilitate the development of collaborations between  
universities and firms  20.1%  30.6%  49.3% 
5  Enable to finance public research  40.3%  32.0%  27.7% 
6  Increase the visibility and credibility of scientists  12.9%  28.1%  59.0% 
7  Decrease the diffusion and dissemination of academic  
Research 34.5%  39.2%  26.3% 
8  Reduce incentives to do basic, non patentable research  65.5%  23.4%  11.1% 
9  Reduce trust and thus decrease collaboration and  
interaction among scientists  69.4%  22.3%  8.3% 
10  Increase the cost to access scientific knowledge  56.8% 29.5%  13.7% 
Note: Based on 278 responses. 
 
Those results can be compared with the work done by Davis et al. (2008), which is the only 
comparable study we know. These authors assess and try to explain the perception of life 
science scientists in Denmark with respect to university patenting. They ask two questions to 
the respondents: whether or not they believe that university patenting had a negative impact 
(1) on the freedom to choose research and (2) on the norms of open science. Overall, they find 
out that 27% of respondents believe that university patenting has a negative impact on the 
freedom to choose research (58% believe it has a neutral effect and 15% a positive effect) and 
41% believe that it has a negative impact on the norms of open science (49% believe it has a 
neutral effect and 10% a positive effect).  
 
                                                 
11 Those figures must be interpreted with care since we assigned a 0 each time a respondent did not give a mark 
to a statement (let a blank). This may bias some answers downwards. This point was clearly stated in the 
questionnaire. But, probably due to lack of time, some respondents still gave a mark only to one or two 
statements out of the 10 that were listed and left a blank for all the others. We therefore assigned a 0 for all the 
statements that were not marked although it is likely that in the mind of the respondents they may have been 
ranked differently. However, the bias induced is likely to remain low since respondents probably neglected to 
give a mark only to statements that did not appear relevant to them and hence for which they disagreed.  
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 As a matter of comparison, in our sample only 8% of the respondents believe that university 
patenting reduces trust and diminishes interactions among scientists. Respondents seem 
therefore to have mostly a positive, and sometimes enthusiastic, image of university patenting. 
This feature must be kept in mind when analysing certain results of the survey. 
 
 
4. Consequences of university patenting: Key findings 
 
4.1 University patenting and the dissemination of academic knowledge 
Our findings suggest that university patenting almost systematically induces a lag in the 
publication process. In a huge majority of cases researchers assert that they are obliged to 
postpone the publication of their research in order to proceed to the patent application. More 
precisely, 218 scientists out of 278 respondents (78%) acknowledge a lag in the publication 
process directly attributable to the patent application. Furthermore, 46 scientists (17% of 
respondents) acknowledge a control over the content of their publications by a partner firm, 
which has the right to deny the publication or to modify the content. Finally 45 scientists 
(16% of respondents) also acknowledge that the patent application obliged them to renounce 
to publish their research (Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1: Consequences directly attributable to the patent application 
 
NOTE: Based on 278 responses.        
 
Figure 4.2: Estimated lag in publication date directly attributable to the patent 
application 
 
NOTE: Based on 218 responses. 
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 Out of the 218 academic inventors who have acknowledged a lag in their publication process, 
about one half (106, which amounts to 49% of the respondents who acknowledge a delay) 
state that this delay exceeded 1 year (Figure 4.2). In many cases it seems therefore that the lag 
is not marginal and can affect the pace of scientific research. One year can sometimes 
represent a very long time at the scale of scientific research. Furthermore, the length of the lag 
does not seem to be discipline specific. For instance, the distribution of scientists who 
acknowledge a lag superior to 1 year is quite homogeneous over scientific disciplines. 
 
Our findings suggest that university patent may impede seriously the diffusion of scientific 
knowledge. It may affect the speed of the diffusion as well as the content of publications
12. 
This finding contributes to feed the debate about the possible extension to European countries 
of the grace period that exists in the US. Such a grace period, which allows scientists to 
publish their research without renouncing to a patent within a period of one year after the first 
publication, would indeed certainly contribute to speed the diffusion of patentable academic 
research (Franzoni and Scelleto 2007). 
 
4.2 University patenting and the commercialization of academic inventions 
With respect to the commercialization of university inventions, our survey tends to confirm 
the Bayh-Dole hypothesis only in some technological fields. 42% of the respondents (114 out 
of the 270 respondents to the question) stated that one of their patented inventions had been 
industrialized or commercialized by a firm. Out of these 114 respondents, more than one half 
considered that the patent played a fundamental role in the process of transferring the 
technology. More precisely, 54% answered that without the patent application their invention 
would not have been exploited (see Table 4.1). Furthermore, 25% considered that although 
their invention would have been exploited should a patent not have been applied for, the 
patent application helped the commercialization or the industrialization of the invention. 
Overall three quarters of the respondents consider therefore that patents helped the industrial 
exploitation of university research and only 7% think that the fact that their invention was 
patented did not play any role to help the transfer of the invention. 
 
This issue of the corporate exploitation of university research is very discipline sensitive. 
Table 4.2 shows the results displayed by sectors. The first column indicates the number of 
respondents who considered that their invention would not have been exploited by a firm 
without a patent. Then, we divided this number by the total number of respondents who said 
that one of their inventions had been exploited by a firm (column 3). The result is displayed in 
the fourth column. This ratio is particularly high for biology and pharmaceuticals. With regard 
to the former, according to the respondents three quarters of the inventions exploited in 
industry would not have been transferred without patents. This ratio goes up to 100% in 
pharmaceuticals and drugs. This means that according to the respondents, in this sector all the 
academic inventions that have been transferred to the industry would have remained on the 
shelves of the university had they not been patented. The ratio is much lower in engineering 
sciences, where almost three quarters of the commercialized inventions would have been 
transferred even without patents. 
                                                 
12 Yet, this finding must be interpreted with care since one of the primary goals of patents is also to help 
knowledge dissemination. For instance, one of the respondents mentioned that: “In the field of chemical 
sciences, a patent is a genuine publication. Some of my patents in the past have not been followed by 
publications in scientific journals because they were so complete that a publication would not have helped to 
diffuse more knowledge […] 95% of the content of publications in scientific journals could not have been 
patented, not due to the lack of industrial application, which is the argument usually put forward, but due to a 
lack of real novelty”. This comment was corroborated by other respondents. 
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Table 4.1: The effect of university patents on the corporate exploitation of university 
research 
Question: If your patented invention has been commercialized or 
industrialized, did the patent play a role within this technology 






Yes, without the patent application the invention would not have been 
exploited 
62 54% 
Yes, without the patent application the invention would have been 
exploited but the patent has facilitated this exploitation 
28 25% 
No, no role at all  8 7% 
I don’t know  16 14% 
Total  114 100% 
Note: Based on 114 responses. This amounts to the academic inventors of an invention that has been 
industrialized or commercialized (42% of respondents). The remaining 58% did not experience the 
commercialization or industrialization of any of their patented inventions. 
 
Table 4.2: Distribution by scientific disciplines of scientists who consider that their 
invention would not have been exploited should a patent not have been granted 
  
Number of 













Ratio of ‘yes’ 
over number of 
respondents 
Biological sciences  14  25.9% 19  73.7%  44  13.6% 
Chemical sciences  15  27.8% 34  44.1%  78  23.1% 
Electronics 7  13%  16  43.8%  45  20.0% 
Medical sciences  8  14.8% 14  57.1%  29  10.3% 
Pharmaceuticals and 
drugs 11  20.4% 11  100%  27  33.3% 
Engineering 4  7.4%  14  28.1%  37  13.5% 
Others 3  5.6%  6  50%  18  22.2% 
Total 62  100%  114    278   
 
 
Our work brings therefore new insights with regard to the Bayh-Dole hypothesis, which 
assumes that patenting university research helps the commercialization and use of these 
researches in industry. This hypothesis seems to be especially relevant in life science sectors 
such as biology, pharmaceuticals and medical sciences, but less so in engineering. 
 
 
4.3 University patenting and the culture of “open science” 
Our study brings only limited evidence with respect to the consequences of university 
patenting on the culture of “open science”. On the one hand, only a very low proportion of 
respondents consider that their participation in a patent application decreased the rate of their 
interactions with the rest of the scientific community (Figure 4.1). Only 11 scientists out of 
278 respondents (4%) consider this to be true. The fact that academic patenting does not seem 
to affect significantly interactions among researchers also emerges when one asks researchers 
directly about their perception of university patents. Only 8% of respondents consider that 
university patenting reduces trust and diminishes collaborations and interactions among 
scientists. But, on the other hand, 36 scientists out of 278 respondents (13%) confess that their 
participation in a patent has somehow triggered some conflicts with other members of the 
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 scientific community or with industrial partners (Figure 4.1). This last finding suggests 
therefore that patents are not always neutral and that they can be a potential source of tension 
within scientific communities, decreasing the necessary trust to foster collective research. 
 
Table 4.3: Perception of academic inventors by scientific colleagues 
Question: How was your participation to a patent 
application perceived by your scientific colleagues? 






Rather positive image  148 53% 
Indifference  77 28% 
Rather negative image  15 5% 
I don’t know  38 14% 
Total  278 100% 
Note: Based on 278 responses. 
Furthermore, our study does not provide evidence to sustain the hypothesis that academic 
inventors are ostracized among the scientific community. Most scientists think that their 
patent application was positively considered by their scientific colleagues (53%). Only 15 
inventors out of the 278 respondents (5%) think that their implication in a patent application 
was badly perceived within their scientific environment (Table 4.3). 
 
4.4 University patenting and incentives to do basic research 
Our study suggests that university patent may not be neutral with respect to the agenda of 
scientists. We asked academic inventors whether or not the possibility to be granted patents 
had any influence over their research agenda. Results are displayed in Table 4.4. Almost 20% 
of the respondents acknowledged that they tend to orient their research in areas where they 
know they will be able to get patents. This may indeed suggest that, at least for some 
researchers, the possibility to get patents encourages them to do less basic research and more 
applied research. Furthermore, consequences of academic patenting on the nature of academic 
research are very sector specific. Table 4.5 shows that this issue may be specifically relevant 
in chemical sciences and in pharmaceuticals and drugs and much less in engineering and 
biological sciences. 
 
Table 4.4: Influence of university patents over scientists’ research agenda 
Question: Did the possibility to be granted patents 







Yes, I try to orient my research in fields where I know it 
will be possible to apply for patents 
54 19.4% 
No  215 77.3% 
I don’t know  9 3.3% 
Total  278 100% 
Note: Based on 278 responses. We voluntarily did not use the words “applied research” and “basic research” in 
this question in order to dismiss any misunderstanding from respondents. 
 
Again, this interpretation must be taken with care since, as noticed by some respondents, 
behind any patent application there is an important amount of basic research. Another finding 
urges us to interpret this finding carefully: When researchers are asked whether or not 
university patents “decrease incentives to do basic research” they almost unanimously 
disagree with this statement. Only 11% agree (Table 3.5). This may suggest that whereas 
some researchers indeed decide their research agenda according to patent possibility, they do 
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 not consider that this induces a reduction of their activity in basic research. A possible 
explanation of this feature is the increasingly blurred frontier between basic and applied 
research in some technological fields. 
 
Table 4.5: Distribution by scientific disciplines of scientists who acknowledge orienting 









Ratio of ‘yes’ over 
number of 
respondents 
Biological sciences  6  11.1%  44  13.6% 
Chemical sciences  18  33.3%  78  23.1% 
Electronics 9  16.7%  45  20.0% 
Medical sciences  3  5.6%  29  10.3% 
Pharmaceuticals and drugs  9  16.7%  27  33.3% 
Engineering 5  9.3%  37  13.5% 
Others 4  7.4%  18  22.2% 
Total 54  100%  278   
 
 
Related to the question of the effect of academic patenting on the research agenda of 
scientists, 26 respondents (9,4%) also considered that the patent application led them to 
reduce the amount of time spent to do research (Figure 4.1). Although we did not ask 
researchers to explain this reduction of their activity of research, open comments made by 
some respondents suggest that this is mainly due to the administrative burden and to the 
necessity to follow the invention after it has been patented (bargaining with industrialists, 
time spent to explain the invention, etc.). 
 
4.5 University patenting and access to upstream research 
With respect to this issue, our findings are not as optimistic as Cohen and Walsh’s (2003). A 
significant share of respondents acknowledges having been obliged to reorient their research 
due to patent problems. Almost one quarter of the respondents (68, which represents 24% of 
respondents) acknowledge having been obliged to change their research agenda to get round 
patents held by other inventors. Yet, we do not know whether those scientists were obliged to 
change their research agenda due to university patents or due to corporate patents. Moreover, 
14% of the respondents also confess having already been involved at least once in a patent 
litigation. These results are displayed in Table 4.6 and 4.7. 
 
Table 4.6: Access to upstream research 
Question: Have you already been disturbed in your research by patents held 





Yes, I have already been obliged to reorient my research in order to get 
round a patent held by a tierce organization  
66 24% 
Yes, my lab has already been obliged to buy licenses to other inventors in 
order to be allowed to pursue research in a given technological domain 
2 0.7% 
No  207 75.3% 
Total  275 100% 




 Table 4.7: Academic inventors involved in patent litigations 
Question: Have you already been implied in a 





Yes  39 14% 
No  240 86% 
Total  279 100% 
Note: Based on 279 responses. 
 
Again, the issue of patents as impeding access to existing knowledge is very sector specific. 
Table 4.8 indicates that this question is particularly relevant in electronics and pharmaceutical 
and drugs, while it is less important in Biology. In this latter field we find nevertheless that 
15.9% of respondents acknowledge having been obliged to reorient their research in order not 
to infringe patents held by others. In electronics this shares goes up to 33.3% and in 
pharmaceuticals up to 37%. 
 
Overall, these results suggest that patents may in some cases be serious impediments to 
upstream research. This stands in sharp contrast with the work of Cohen and Walsh in the 
field of biomedical sciences. Yet, respondents do not seem to worry too much about the 
consequences of university patenting on the access to existing inventions. Only 13.7% of 
respondents believe that patents increase the cost of access to existing knowledge (Table 3.5). 
 
Table 4.8: Distribution by scientific discipline of scientists involved in patent litigation 






 Respondents (2)  (1) over (2) 
‘yes’, involved 
 in patent  
litigation (3)  (3) over (2) 
Biological sciences  7  44  15.9%  5  11.4% 
Chemical sciences  21  78  26.9%  11  14.1% 
Electronics 15  45  33.3%  6  13.3% 
Medical sciences  6  29  20.7%  5  17.2% 
Pharmaceuticals  
and drugs  10  27  37%  5  18.5% 
Engineering 8 37  21.6%  1  2.7% 
Others 1  18  5.6%  6  33.3% 





This paper used a new source of information to explore the consequences of university 
patenting. Via a survey conducted in April and May 2008, we asked questions directly to 
academic inventors, i.e. to scientists who have been involved in patenting activities. Those are 
indeed the best persons to know about the effects their patents have had on their research and 
publication activities, the commercialization of their inventions, the granting of funds, etc. 
Overall we collected information on 280 academic inventors. Of course, like all 
questionnaire-based studies, results must be taken with care due to multiple possible biases. 
Our results are not based on perfectly objective facts but on what respondents have told us. 
Yet, in the case of university patenting, where objective figures are rare, this nevertheless 
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 allows us to provide a rich bundle of new insights. Relying on this original and, to our 
knowledge, unique dataset our work outlines the following results: 
 
-  University patenting almost systematically induces a lag in the publication of 
academic research. About 80% of the respondents acknowledge a delay in their 
publication directly attributable to the patenting process. Furthermore in half the cases 
this lag is longer than 1 year. Some respondents also explain that their patenting 
activities prevent them from publishing their research or led to a control by industrial 
partners over the content of their publication. This result may call for an extension to 
European countries of the grace period that exists in the US, at least for academic 
patents (Franzoni and Scellato, 2007). 
-  University patenting can be helpful to transfer inventions from universities to industry 
in certain sectors (the so-called Bayh-Dole Hypothesis). About 40% of the 
respondents say that one of their inventions has been used by a firm. More than half of 
these respondents who have experienced technology transfer also think that the 
transfer would not have been realized without the existence of the patent. Patents are 
specifically helpful to enable the transfer of university inventions to industry in fields 
such as pharmaceuticals and biology. 
-  Our study provides only limited evidence with respect to the effect of university patent 
on interactions and exchanges within the scientific community. Yet, the little evidence 
we have suggests that university patenting does not seem to interfere too much with 
the open science culture (the issue of the publication lag put apart). For instance, a 
huge majority of respondents think that their patenting activity is rather well perceived 
by their colleagues. 
-  University patenting can increase the cost of accessing upstream research and can 
block research in some technological fields. About 25% of the respondents confess 
that they have already been obliged to re-orient their research because of risks of 
infringements. 
-  University patenting can in some cases lead to a modification of the research agenda 
of scientists and encourage some of them to do more applied, patentable research and 
less basic, non-patentable research. 20% of the respondents acknowledge that 
university patents affect their research agenda. More specifically, the possibility to be 
granted patents induces them to undertake research in patentable areas rather than in 
non-patentable areas. Yet, this result must be taken with care since patentable research 
may not necessarily be done to the detriment of basic research. 
 
The purpose of this paper was to display the first descriptive statistics of our survey on the 
consequences of university patenting. This new and rich dataset opens the way for many 
future works: First, an econometric treatment should allow us to deepen the analysis. Second, 
for some questions, it is necessary to balance the answers of our respondents with those of a 
control sample (scientists who are not patent inventors). Third, international comparisons may 
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